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_____________________________________________________________________________ 
This paper examines the introduction of information-sharing into the supply chains for 
pharmaceutical products in the United States.  This introduction was unusual for several reasons. 
First, it was catalyzed from outside the industry, by a Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) investigation into improper financial reporting by a single manufacturer. Second, it was 
initiated by pharmaceutical manufacturers in order to keep distributor inventories low.  Third, 
although its effect on pharmaceutical distributors has been profound, evidence indicates that 
information-sharing has had no impact on pharmaceutical manufacturers' own inventory-
management practices.  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Over the last twenty years, information-sharing has revolutionized supply-chain 
management.  Indeed, it is now generally taken as a “given” that information-sharing in the 
supply chains for any product/service will inevitably bring about improved efficiency and/or 
effectiveness up and down the supply chain. 
  This paper examines the introduction of information-sharing into the supply chains for 
pharmaceutical products in the United States.  This introduction was unusual because it was 
catalyzed from outside the industry, by a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
investigation into improper financial reporting by a single manufacturer.  
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  This introduction was unusual in other ways, too:  First, it was initiated by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in order to keep distributor inventories low.   
“The  impetus  for  the  fee-for-service  model  came  from  the  drug 
manufacturers, which were under ‘a lot of pressure to reduce their 
amount of inventory in the channel’ by the SEC and the FDA, said 
Larry  Marsh,  Managing  Director  of  Lehman  Brothers.”  — 
Modern Healthcare, 9/6/2004 
Second, although its effect on pharmaceutical distributors has been profound, evidence indicates 
that information-sharing has had no impact on pharmaceutical manufacturers' own inventory-
management practices. 
  This paper should be of interest to anyone interested in how quickly and profoundly a 
company's business model — in this case, the major pharmaceutical distributors’ business model 
—  changes and how its efficiency can increase if it is "forced" to carry significantly lower 
inventories.  And, it should be an object lesson for anyone who believes that information-sharing 
will inevitably bring about improvements in efficiency and effectiveness up and down the supply 
chain.   
BACKGROUND 
  Relatively little has been published in the supply-chain/operations-management literature 
about healthcare-product supply chains, in general, or pharmaceutical supply chains, in 
particular.  Burns’ (2002) book is the most frequently-cited general reference.  A 2005 report 
published by The Kaiser Family Foundation describes the organizations involved in the U.S.  
retail supply chain and the key financial relationships among them.  Most other available  
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resources are website postings from industry experts and consulting companies; and these 
typically do not cite accessible databases.  We offer the following background. 
  Although the development and manufacture of pharmaceuticals is typically complex, the 
physical distribution of pharmaceutical products is straightforward.  According to a 2007 study 
by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, nearly 80% of prescription drug volume flows from 
manufacturers to distributors (often called "wholesalers") and then either to providers (e.g., 
hospitals, clinics) or to retail pharmacies.   
  Pharmaceutical manufacturing is diverse in nature and international in scope.  In the 
United States, the 10 largest pharmaceutical corporations, as measured by sales, accounted for 
almost 60% of sales in 2004 (The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005).  Brand-name 
pharmaceutical manufacturers generally experience large profit margins; e.g., between 1995 and 
2008 the Top-5 manufacturers had an average aggregate profit margin of 18.5%. 
  Pharmaceutical distribution in the US is highly concentrated.  Three companies —  
AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health, and McKesson — share about 90% of the market.  
Pharmaceutical distributors, on the other hand, generally experience small profit margins; e.g., 
during the same 1995-2008 period, the Top-3 distributors had an average aggregate profit margin 
of 1.2%.   
  More interesting, however, is the source of distributor profits.  According to Adam Fein, 
Pembroke Consulting, in 2004:  
"...approximately  85%  of  wholesaler  gross-margin  dollars  come 
from the buy side."   
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Indeed, unlike distributors of most other products, who earn money on the "sell side", 
pharmaceutical distributors earn most of their gross margin from the manufacturers whose 
products they distribute. 
  There are many reasons for this, among them the buying power of large retail 
pharmaceutical chains, which dispense the majority of pharmaceuticals, and cost pressure on 
providers (e.g., hospitals) by third-party payers (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, insurance companies).  
This cost pressure encouraged the development of healthcare group-purchasing organizations, 
which negotiate the prices that their (otherwise unaffiliated) provider-members pay for 
pharmaceuticals and other supplies. 
The Rise of Investment Buying 
  Given little/no opportunity to earn gross margin from the sell side of their business, 
pharmaceutical distributors looked for ways to make money on the buy side; and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers provided a way for them to do so:  steady price increases.  
  During the decade of the 1990's, manufacturers' price increases for the most widely-used 
drugs averaged 1% above inflation.  Figure 1 provides data for 2002-2008:  Note that 
manufacturers' annual increases for the most-widely used brand-name drugs ranged from 5.3 to 
8.7% while inflation ranged from 1.6 to 3.8%. These steady and relatively predictable increases 
provided the opportunity for distributors to capture gross margin on the buy side:  by "investment 
buying". 
  Under investment buying, distributors made money by purchasing large quantities of 
pharmaceuticals in anticipation of a manufacturer's price increase, often borrowing the funds to 
do so.  Then, once the price increased, distributors were able to sell to their price-conscious  
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buyers at a very small mark-up — indeed, sometimes at a discount with respect to the new, 
higher price — and still earn a positive margin. 
" ... the rule of thumb at the time was that a 1% price increase paid 
for  1-month's  supply "  —  Trade  Account  Manager,  Major 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer  
Investment buying became such a significant source of gross margin that, according to a 
manager at one of the Big-3 distributors, "The Big-3 all had teams of employees using 
mathematical models to forecast price increases". 
  Investment buying also provided pharmaceutical manufacturers the opportunity to 
manage sales by pushing product down to distributors; i.e., "channel stuffing".  It also virtually 
guaranteed manufacturers that their distributors would never run out of the manufacturers' 
products, which might otherwise cause a lost sale. 
  There were, of course, disadvantages to both parties.  For distributors, investment buying 
involved financial risk; i.e., "gambling" on a price increase; and some of these bets were wrong.  
The so-called "secondary market" for pharmaceuticals, which was 
originally used by larger distributors to sell to small distributors, 
evolved to become a market through which distributor overstocks 
were bought and sold.  This secondary market provided an avenue 
through  which  counterfeit  drugs  entered  the  legitimate  US 
pharmaceutical supply chain.  But, this is another story. 
 For manufacturers, investment buying meant some lost revenue (on the products purchased at 
the lower price), and significant volatility in distributor ordering.  Presumably, this volatility 
required manufacturers to carry increased safety stocks.  
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  Yet, the major disadvantage of investment buying, from the perspective of supply-chain 
coordination, was that it led to an environment of no information-sharing, sometimes 
misinformation-sharing, between the manufacturers and the distributors. According to a Manager 
in one of the top U.S.-based pharmaceutical distributors, 
"It was a game of cat-and-mouse:  the distributors didn't want the 
manufacturers to know what they were selling and what they were 
holding,  so  that  they  could  order  whatever  they  wanted.    The 
manufacturers, well, they wanted to manage their sales, but they 
didn't want to give away the farm." 
Hence, instead of sharing information, distributors went out of their way to not share inventory, 
customer-ordering, or shipping information with manufacturers. 
  Despite its disadvantages, the "end" of investment buying was catalyzed from outside the 
industry:  By the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
  In 2001, the SEC announced an investigation of Bristol Myers Squib (BMS).  According 
to Fein (2005), BMS was: 
"...alleged to have had its wholesalers purchase excess inventory 
in  2000  and  2001  in  order  to  meet  sales  and  earnings 
projections...subsequent  investigations  forced  BMS  to  restate  its 
financial records from 1999 through 2002 and officially announce 
an end to forward (investment) buying by wholesalers in March, 
2003....The  company  entered  into  a  settlement  with  the  SEC  in 
August,  2004,  that  was  reported  to  'limits  future  sales  to  
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wholesalers based on demand or on amounts that do not exceed 
approximately one month of inventory on hand." 
  It is important to note, first, that channel stuffing is not, per se, illegal.  Nor was BMS 
ever found guilty of anything.  Instead, BMS reached a settlement with the SEC, agreeing to 
restate its financial reports, and agreeing to pay $300 Million in fines and payments to investors. 
The company entered into a final settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
August, 2004 thatwas reported to "limit future sales to wholesalers based on demand or amounts 
that do not exceed approximately one month of inventory on hand" Fein (2005). 
  Although public attention was focused on BMS, in fact, most of the major 
pharmaceutical manufacturers participated in investment buying, and some were under scrutiny.   
 “....(drug manufacturers were under) a lot of pressure to reduce 
their amount of inventory in the channel’ by the SEC and the FDA, 
said Larry Marsh, managing director of Lehman Brothers. ‘This is 
an indirect response to greater regulatory scrutiny over the drug 
industry, which came about when there was the recognition that 
channel-stuffing (stockpiling drug inventory) had become a fairly 
persistent practice.’” — Modern Healthcare, 9/6/04 
 
The Rise of Fee-for-Service and Inventory-Management Agreements 
  With the SEC investigation of BMS in the background, the pharmaceutical supply chain 
began to replace investment buying with a "fee-for-service (FFS)" model with Inventory-
Management Agreements (IMAs).  
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  Under a FFS/IMA model, pharmaceutical distributors receive fees directly from 
pharmaceutical manufacturers for the distribution services that the distributors provide.  The 
details of these agreements are proprietary, but, according to insiders, FFS/IMAs have two parts:  
First, an Inventory Management Agreement (IMA); i.e., a schedule of incentives for the 
distributor to maintain low inventories.  In other words, the lower the distributor's inventory the 
larger the distributor's discount on products purchased, provided that the distributor meets 
specific (high) service-level targets.  Second, fees in exchange for information reported to the 
manufacturer (e.g., distributor days-on-hand inventory, daily orders and shipments to the 
distributor's customers) by the distributor. 
  Although it is difficult to determine exactly when FFS/IMAs were started, we believe that 
it was in the 2002-03 time frame; and, according to Fein (2005):  
"Industry estimates indicate that up to 70 percent of distribution 
volume was covered by IMAs by the end of 2004."  
According to a Vice-President of Marketing at McKesson one of the Big-3, 95% of McKesson's 
manufacturers were under IMAs by the end of 2004.  
  Note that although distributors continue to receive most of their gross margin from the 
buy side, they now receive that margin directly from the manufacturers (as discounts or fees) for 
their services.  Indeed, under IMAs, distributors are rewarded for maintaining lower inventories.  
Last, but most relevant to one of our major findings:  Since 2002-03, IMAs have been providing 
manufacturers with information about distributor inventories and their downstream customer 
orders.  This is information that manufacturers did not receive in the days of investment buying, 
and information that should be very useful to manufacturers in managing their own inventories.  
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  Next, we present the findings from our study of the impact of the FFS/IMAs on the 
pharmaceutical distributors and manufacturers.  The evidence we provide is based on financial 
information from the 3 largest distributors (AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal, and McKesson), 
which account for approximately 90% of total US distributor dollar volume; and M3 (US Census 
Bureau) data on US pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing inventory dollars and shipment 
dollars.  Additional information is from annual surveys conducted by the Healthcare Distributors 
Management Association (HDMA).  We also interviewed approximately one dozen 
pharmaceutical supply-chain executives. 
OUR FINDINGS 
  Inventory Management Agreements (IMAs) have had a profound effect on 
pharmaceutical distributors; and, the effect appears to have taken place in two steps.  In step one, 
IMAs required distributors to reduce their inventories but still meet manufacturer-specified 
service-level targets.  In order to do so, distributors improved their business processes.  We will 
document the reductions and some of the improvements. These improvements facilitated step 
two: even further reductions in inventory and further increases in turnover:  not only meeting, but 
exceeding the service-level targets that manufacturers had initially specified. 
  Supply-chain theory suggests two effects of IMAs on manufacturers: one in the short run, 
before manufacturers were able to take advantage of the information provided to them under 
IMAs; and one in the long run, once they were able to do so.  In the short run, theory suggests 
that manufacturer inventories would either increase or decrease, the net effect depending on the 
magnitude of opposing influences (described below).  The evidence is that manufacturer 
inventories increased slightly.  In the long run, once manufacturers have been able to take 
advantage of information provided to them under IMAs, theory (and experience in other supply  
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chains) predicts reduced manufacturer inventories (and increased turnover).  The evidence is that 
manufacturer inventories have continued to increase.  Although there are several possible 
reasons for this increase, we believe that manufacturers have not taken advantage of the 
information being shared with them, either because they are ignorant about the opportunity to 
reduce their inventories, or because they don't care. 
 
The Impact of IMAs on Pharmaceutical Distributors 
  Inventory Management Agreements (IMAs) have had a profound effect on 
pharmaceutical distributors; and, the effect appears to have taken place in two steps.  First, 
distributors were required to dramatically reduce their inventories.  They did so.  Figure 2, an 
extension of Exhibit 2 in Fein (2005), displays the annual changes in revenue and inventories at 
the Big-3 pharmaceutical distributors between 2001 and 2009.  Note that in 2001, when 
investment buying was still largely in place, inventories increased more than sales.  In every year 
since (except 2007), inventories increased less than sales, and in 2005 and 2009 they decreased.  
Figure 3 displays the aggregate inventory turnover at the Big-3 distributors.  Note that between 
2001 and 2004, turnover increased from 7.4 to 9.5. 
  Common sense (and the theory of efficient markets) suggests that in order to accomplish 
a significant reduction in inventory in the 2001-2004 interval, distributors must have improved 
their business processes.  Schwarz (1998) codifies these notions using the Information/Control/ 
Buffer (ICB) Portfolio paradigm.  Under the ICB Portfolio paradigm, every management system 
consists of 4 elements (information, decision-making, implementation, and buffering).  Each of 
these four elements has quality characteristics.  Everything else being equal, the better the 
information, decision-making, and implementation (e.g., the more accurate for forecast, the  
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faster the implementation), the smaller the buffers (e.g., inventory) required to manage at any 
fixed level of customer service.  Correspondingly, if inventories are forced to be lower, then 
information, decision-making, and/or implementation must become better.   
According to our sources, this is what occurred. 
"McKesson adopted SAP starting in 2002.  This system including 
tracking  inventory  at  the  SKU  level"  —  Vice  President  of 
Marketing, McKesson 
During this same time period, AmerisourceBergen adopted internal systems to incentivize 
improved efficiency in order picking.  Many distributors also installed new IT systems for better 
inventory management. 
  These improved business processes — and, perhaps, a refocusing of management 
attention away from "gambling" on manufacturer price-increases towards their core competence 
— brought about step two: even further reductions in inventory and increased efficiency.  Take 
another look at Figure 3, now focusing on the 2004-2009 interval, after IMAs had already been 
widely adopted by the industry: inventory turnover increased from 9.5 to 13.5!  Figure 4 displays 
increasing distributor average fill-rate over the same time interval.  And, in terms of out-of-
stocks:  Note the decreasing distributor out-of-stocks and the increasing percentages of out-of-
stocks due to manufacturer problems, despite higher levels of inventory at the manufacturers. 
  Figure 5 displays the impact of IMAs at the distributors in a different way.  It displays the 
changes in total inventory at the Big-3 distributors over three time intervals.  On the left, note 
(shaded area) that distributor inventory increased $1,386 Million between 2001 and 2004.  
Assuming the same inventory turnover in 2004 as in 2001, inventory should have increased 
$6,901.  This is a savings of $5,515 Million.  Similarly, between 2004 and 2009 distributor 
inventory increased $485 Million.  Assuming the same inventory turnover in 2009 as in 2001,  
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inventory should have increased $11,342 Million: a savings of $10,857 Million.  Hence, the 
distributors' inventory saving between 2001 and 2009 is $16,371 Million. 
 
The Non-Impact of Information-Sharing on Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
  Next, we examine the impact of information-sharing on pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
Supply-chain theory suggests two effects: one in the short run (i.e., 2001-2004), before 
manufacturers were able to take advantage of the information provided to them under IMAs; and 
one in the long run (e.g., 2004-2009), once they were able to do so.   
  In the short run, several influences must have been at work.  First, everything else being 
equal, in order to provide the same level of service to providers, the reduction of distributor 
inventories would necessitate some increase in manufacturer inventories; i.e., a shift in supply-
chain inventory from the distributors up to the manufacturers.  Yet, this shift provides some risk-
pooling, so the shift should not be expected to be one-for-one.  On the other hand, given the 
volatility of distributor ordering under investment buying, theory would predict that 
manufacturers should be able to reduce their safety stocks under FFS/IMAs,  since distributor 
orders should be smaller, more frequent, and, hence, more predictable.  In summary, theory 
suggests that manufacturer inventories should either increase or decrease, the net effect 
depending on the magnitude of these opposing influences.  In the long run, once manufacturers 
have been able to take advantage of the detailed information provided to them under IMAs and 
the reduced volatility of distributor orders, supply-chain theory would predict reduced 
inventories and increased turnover.  
  Figure 6 displays what did happen. It is a plot of aggregate inventory turnover at US 
pharmaceutical manufacturers between 2001 and 2009.  It does display a decrease in turnover  
 
7/15/10  13 
(i.e., an increase in manufacturer inventories) in 2004 (7.8) compared to 2002 and 2003 (8.1 and 
8.3, respectively), indicating a short-run shift in supply-chain inventory from the distributors to 
the manufacturers.  More important, overall, the trend has been a decrease in turnover; i.e., an 
increase in manufacturer inventories.  Hence, there is no evidence that manufacturers have taken 
advantage of the information being provided to them under IMAs to lower their inventories 
(based on improved forecasting, better production scheduling, etc.).  Indeed, those inventories 
have increased! 
  Figure 7 provides an alternative perspective.  Between 2001 and 2004 total manufacturer 
inventory increased $3,529 Million.  Assuming the same inventory turnover in 2004 as in 2001, 
inventory should have increased only $3,362 Million:  a loss of $167 Million.  Similarly, starting 
in 2004, manufacturer inventory increased to $2,306 Million by 2009. Assuming the same 
inventory turnover in 2004 and 2009 as in 2001, inventory should have increased only $1,773 
Million:  a loss of $533 Million.  Finally, assuming the same inventory turnover in 2009 as in 
2001, inventory should have increased only $5,135 Million instead of $5,835 Million: a loss of 
$700 Million.  
  Figure 8 provides a supply-chain view, by combining Figures 5 and 7.  Supply-chain 
inventory (manufacturer plus distributor) inventory increased $4,915 Million between 2001 and 
2004.  Based on inventory turnovers in 2001, this increase should have been $10,263 Million, a 
saving of $5,348 Million.  Finally, based on 2001 inventory turnovers, between 2001 and 2009, 
the pharmaceutical supply chain has enjoyed an inventory reduction of $15,671 Million, or $15.7 
Billion, $16.4 Billion in savings at the distributors and a $700 Million increase at the 
manufacturers.    
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  Evidently, manufacturers have failed to take advantage of the information provided to 
them by the distributors in order to improve their production planning and reduce their 
inventories. 
  So, are manufacturers using this information for other purposes?  Based on our 
interviews, the answer is "yes".  First, it is used on an aggregate basis to forecast quarterly sales 
for financial forecasting.  
"We are using IMA information to forecast day-by-day orders from 
the distributors, and is using this information to prepare financial 
forecasts  (e.g.,  monthly  and  quarterly  sales  and  income),  to 
provide  better  explanation  to  analysts  regarding  our  financial 
statements  "  —  Supply-Chain  Director,  Major  Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer 
It is reported that manufacturers also use IMA-provided information about specific large 
provider and retail accounts for sales/promotional purposes.  Indeed, an executive of one 
provider chain reported the manufacturers are offering providers the opportunity to do 
investment buying! 
  Nonetheless, the question remains:  Given that manufacturers aren't using the 
information about downstream orders and inventories in order to manage their own inventories 
better, then why not? 
It is well known that pharmaceutical manufacturing often involves long cycle times, 
large  fixed  lot  sizes,  and  “delays”  for  quality  assurance.   Consequently,  according  to  one 
consultant interviewed, it isn’t unusual for forecasts to be blocked out 12-18 months in advance, 
and for production schedules to be frozen 6 months in advance. Another consultant suggested  
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that  some  manufacturers  understand  the  potential  of  supply-chain  management  to  reduce 
inventories  and  improve  profits,  but  that  they  don't  know  how  to  take  advantage  of  this 
information.   
Indeed, the production supply chain for pharmaceuticals is relatively complex, making it 
more difficult to utilize the information.  However, another explanation, more blunt, yet probably 
more accurate, is that most manufacturers don't think of supply-chain management as a priority 
and probably have not paid much attention to it.  An internal supply-chain consultant for a well-
known brand-name manufacturer offered the opinion that "our inventories just aren't that large".    
  Although some manufacturers do operate with smaller inventories than others, in 2009, 
the top-5 pharmaceutical manufacturers (Pfizer, Merck, Johnson&Johnson, Astrazeneca, and 
BMS) reported an aggregate inventory investment of $28.8 Billion, or 17.2 percent of current 
assets and 49.0 percent of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).  Looked at another way, 
using an inventory-holding cost rate of 20%, these manufacturers incurred aggregate inventory-
holding costs of $5.8 Billion, or 9.8% of EBIT. 
  Given the rise in importance of supply-chain management in other industries and the 
uncertain future profitability of pharmaceutical manufacturing, this leads to the question:  Why 
don't pharmaceutical manufacturers pay more attention to supply-chain management?  One 
expert offered the opinion that, from a public-relations perspective, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers don't want to be seen as limiting supply in order to increase prices.  But, other 
industries have demonstrated the ability to lower inventories and maintain or improve supply, 
given better information. 
  Finally, is it possible that pharmaceutical manufacturers are paying attention to supply-
chain management, but that it just has not (yet) had an impact? One consultant mentioned that  
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some manufacturers are starting to look at the potential of supply-chain management in terms of 
information sharing.  
  In summary, although there are several possible reasons for the increase in manufacturer 
inventories, we firmly believe that pharmaceutical manufacturers are forsaking the opportunity to 
improve their production planning and reduce their inventories — potentially substantial 
reductions — either because they are ignorant of the opportunity or because they just don't care. 
Given the tremendous pressure on pharmaceutical manufacturers to improve their long-term 
profitability, perhaps it is time for them to add supply-chain management to marketing and 
product-development as a competitive priority.   
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUPPLY-CHAIN RESEARCHERS 
  Although our results "find fault" with the priorities and/or abilities of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, there is plenty of "fault" to go around.  In particular, supply-chain researchers 
have largely ignored the supply chains for healthcare products.  Or, like us three years ago, 
assumed that healthcare-product supply chains are similar to those for consumer or industrial 
products.   In fact, these supply chains are quite unusual, as described by Schwarz (forthcoming), 
both in terms of the organizations involved (e.g., group purchasing organizations) and the 
business processes (e.g. investment buying).   
  Pharmaceutical supply chains, in particular, are quite complex, on both the 
input/manufacturing and the output/distribution side.  To illustrate:  Each step of the 
manufacturing process is typically complex, with very long set-up times (e.g., weeks), and 
subject to rigorous quality control.  Different steps in the production process are often performed 
in different countries, based partly on familiar notions of plant loading, but also sensitive to taxes 
and financial considerations.  One consultant that we interviewed suggested that, in view of this  
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complexity, manufacturer inventories are simply the result of a feasible plan; i.e., that inventories 
or inventory-related costs are not in the planner's objective function. There are many 
opportunities for learning and research on the input/manufacturing side of pharmaceutical supply 
chains. 
  There are also many opportunities for learning and supply-chain research on the 
distribution/logistics side of pharmaceutical supply chains, where our work has been.  At the 
macro level, there are questions to be answered in terms of supply-chain design.  For example, 
should a pharmaceutical manufacturer use the existing wholesaler intermediary or distribute 
direct to providers (e.g., hospitals) as some medical-device manufacturers do?  Should a 
manufacturer manage its own inventory and logistics, as most do today, or outsource it to a 3PL 
(as Pfizer  recently did to United Parcel Service)?  In terms of the existing supply chain, how 
should Inventory Management Agreements (IMAs) and fee-for-service (FFS) contracts be 
designed, and how can manufacturers take best advantage of the information already available to 
them (which, it seems, they are not using)?  More important, how might IMAs and FFS be 
structured in order to, possibly, coordinate the supply chain? 
  In 2010, the Association for Healthcare Resource & Materials Management (AHRMM), 
a personal membership group of the American Hospital Association (AHA), announced the 
creation of a new research consortium that is focused on health-sector supply-chain research.  
More information is available at " https://achscr.groupsite.com/login". 
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Figure 1: Average Annual Percentage Change in Manufacturer Prices for Widely Used Brand 
Name Prescription Drugs  (2002-2008)* 
 
*Data Source: AARP Public Policy Institute, Rx Watchdog Report 2008 Year-End Update  
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Figure 2: Annual % Changes in Revenues and Inventories at Top 3 Distributors  (2001-2009)* 
*Based on December filings of AmerisourceBergen, McKesson, and Cardinal Health. 
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Figure 3: Inventory Turnover at Top 3 Distributors  (2001-2009)* 
 
*Based on quarterly filings of AmerisourceBergen, McKesson, and Cardinal Health. 
Data Source: Compustat INVTQ and SALEQ variables 
*Aggregate inventory turnover was calculated by dividing combined revenue by combined 
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Figure 4: Distributor Fill Rate and Reasons for Inability to Ship* 
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Figure 5: Inventory Changes and Savings at Top 3 Distributors* 
 
*Based on quarterly filings of AmerisourceBergen, McKesson and Cardinal Health. 
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Figure 6: Inventory Turnover at Manufacturers (2001-2009)* 
 
*Data Source: US Census Bureau Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories and Orders M3 Report 
*Aggregate manufacturer inventory turnover was calculated by dividing the total shipment value 
in any calendar year by the average inventory throughout the same year.  Data was collected 
from the US Census Bureau Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories and Orders M3 Report 
(A25BVS: shipment values, A25BTI: total inventory).  
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Figure 7: Inventory Changes and Opportunity Losses at Manufacturers* 
 
*Data Source: US Census Bureau Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories and Orders M3 Report  
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Figure 8: Supply Chain Inventory Changes and Savings* 
 
*Data Source: US Census Bureau Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories and Orders M3 Report, 
  and quarterly filings of AmerisourceBergen, McKesson and Cardinal Health. 
 
 
 